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Unconditional security of coherent-state quantum key distribution with strong
phase-reference pulse
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We prove the unconditional security of a quantum key distribution protocol in which bit values
are encoded in the phase of a weak coherent-state pulse relative to a strong reference pulse. In
contrast to implementations in which a weak pulse is used as a substitute for a single-photon source,
the achievable key rate is found to decrease only linearly with the transmission of the channel.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd 03.67.-a
Quantum key distribution provides a way to distribute
a secret key between two distant parties, Alice and Bob,
even if the quantum channel between them suffers from
small noises. As long as the law of quantum mechanics
is valid, an eavesdropper, Eve, cannot force Alice and
Bob to accept a key on which she has a nonnegligible
amount of information. A proof of such unconditional
security was first provided by Mayers [1] for the BB84
protocol [2], followed by other proofs [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
While a perfect single-photon source is assumed in the
earlier proofs, recent proofs [5, 6] cover the use of a weak
laser pulse in a coherent state as a substitute for a single
photon. This is good news in the practical point of view,
but comes with a price: the multiphoton components
of the weak pulse allow Eve a so-called photon-number
splitting attack [9, 10]. In order to achieve the security
under this attack, Alice must lower the amplitude of her
weak pulse as the loss in the channel increases. As a
result, there is a bound [10] on the achievable key rate
which scales as O(η2) with channel transmission η.
In this paper, we prove an unconditional security of
a scheme using a weak coherent pulse and achieving a
rate that scales as O(η). The scheme is essentially the
one proposed by Bennett [11], in which a strong pulse
is transmitted as a phase reference together with a weak
pulse containing the bit information in the relative phase.
We made a minor modification to introduce a second lo-
cal oscillator (LO) for Bob. This makes the analysis sim-
pler, and allows us to assume a realistic threshold detec-
tor that may be noisy, inefficient, sensitive to multimodes
of light, and only discriminates the vacuum from one or
more photons.
The scheme is depicted in Fig. 1(a). Suppose that
Alice’s LO emits a strong pulse in a coherent state with
complex amplitude |α0|eiφA . Using an asymmetric beam-
splitter (BS1), Alice extracts a weak pulse with very
small amplitude α = |α|eiφA , and encodes a randomly
chosen bit value 0 or 1 by applying phase shift 0 or π, re-
sulting in state |α〉 or | −α〉, respectively. Together with
this signal, she sends the strong pulse from the other
output of BS1 to Bob as a phase reference.
On the receiver’s side, Bob chooses randomly a bit
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FIG. 1: (a) A scheme with a strong reference pulse. (b) An
equivalent scheme except that Eve’s region is extended.
value 0 or 1, and applies phase shift 0 or π to the weak
signal pulse, respectively. Instead of using the reference
pulse from Alice directly, Bob uses another LO and tries
to lock its phase to Alice’s one. Suppose that Bob’s LO
produces a strong pulse with complex amplitude |β0|eiφB .
Combining a potion of this pulse and the reference pulse
from Alice, he conducts a series of interference experi-
ments (M) to infer the phase difference φA − φB . He
then applies a phase shift equal to this estimated value
φ∗ to his LO, and mixes it with the weak signal from Al-
ice at BS2. The mixed signal is measured by a threshold
detector, which gives a “click” whenever it receives one
or more photons. Bob reports the outcome of the detec-
tor to Alice over an authenticated public channel. The
click implies a conclusive result, and both parties accept
their bits. No click implies an inconclusive result, and
they discard the bits.
The security analysis in this paper is valid even if LOs
with phases φA and φB are available to Eve. Then, the
reference pulse from Alice gives no information to Eve.
The only effect of Eve’s attack on this pulse is to disturb
the measurement outcome φ∗ to be deviated from the
desired value, as φ∗ = φA − φB − ∆φ. But exactly the
2same effect can be obtained by just applying the phase
shift ∆φ to the weak signal from Alice (Eve may simu-
late M by herself). Hence we can safely assume that Eve
simply ignores the strong reference pulse. Similarly, any
imperfection in the estimation process M, including the
fundamental limitation arising from finiteness of the am-
plitudes of the two LOs, has the same effect as introduc-
ing a noise source applying a phase shift ∆φ on the weak
signal while assuming a perfect estimation, φ∗ = φA−φB.
The major imperfections in the detector can be treated
as follows. Suppose that the quantum efficiency of
the detector is ηD, the transmission coefficient of BS2
is ηBS2, and the amplitude of LO incident on BS2 is
(1 − ηBS2)−1η−1D β. Then, the same measurement can
be implemented by inserting a lossy medium (BS3) with
transmission ηBS2ηDη
−1
0 , then mixing LO with amplitude
(1− η0)−1β by a beamsplitter BS4 with transmission η0,
followed by a detector with unit efficiency. Here we take
the limit of η0 → 1. The dark counting of the detector
or the detection of stray photons can be simulated by a
device (P) that inserts a photon in a mode that is orthog-
onal to the modes of the LOs. We thus finally arrive at
a scheme with an ideal threshold detector and a locked
pair of LOs, as in Fig. 1(b). In this figure, the region ac-
cessible by Eve is extended for the sake of simplicity. If
a protocol is secure with this scheme, the same protocol
implemented by the scheme in Fig. 1(a) is also secure.
Bob’s decision process in the scheme in Fig. 1(b) can
be regarded as a generalized measurement on the light
entering his site with three outcomes, 0, 1, and 2, where
the last one means “inconclusive”. Let HB = H0⊗H1⊗
· · · ⊗ Hν ⊗ · · · be the Hilbert space for the light modes
received by Bob that are sensible by the detector. The
mode ν = 0 represents the pulse mode of Bob’s LO, and
the modes with ν ≥ 1 are orthogonal to it. Let us write
the coherent state |β〉0|0〉1|0〉2 · · · simply as |β〉. Then,
the generalized measurement is described by the POVM
{F0, F1, F2}, where
F0 = (1− | − β〉〈−β|)/2, F1 = (1− |β〉〈β|)/2,
and F2 = 1−F0−F1. If everything is ideal except for the
transmission η in the channel, Alice’s signal is received
by Bob in coherent states | ± √ηα〉, and they can agree
on a key without errors by choosing β =
√
ηα.
Before describing the proof of unconditional security,
we introduce several notations. We decompose HB as
HB = KB ⊕Hex, where KB is the two-dimensional sub-
space spanned by |β〉 and | − β〉. We assume α and β
to be real and positive without loss of generality. Let
{|µl〉B}l=1,2,... be an arbitrary complete orthonormal ba-
sis for Hex. We identify KB as a qubit, and define
its X basis as {|0x〉B ≡ (|β〉 + | − β〉)/(2cβ), |1x〉B ≡
(|β〉 − | − β〉)/(2sβ)}, where 2c2β − 1 ≡ 1 − 2s2β ≡
〈−β|β〉 = e−2|β|2 . The Z-basis states are denoted as
|jz〉B ≡ (|0x〉B + (−1)j |1x〉B)/
√
2 (j = 0, 1). For Al-
ice’s side, we denote by HA the Hilbert space of the light
modes emitted from her site. We also introduce an aux-
iliary qubit in Alice’s site, with Hilbert space KA. We
denote the X- and the Z-basis states as |jx〉A and |jz〉A
(j = 0, 1). We sometimes denote the projection |Φ〉〈Φ|
as P (|Φ〉).
The key idea in the security proof is a trace-
nonincreasing completely positive map, which is speci-
fied by Kraus operators Aj : HB → KB (j = 0, 1, 2, . . .)
defined by A0 = sβ|0x〉B〈0x|+ cβ |1x〉B〈1x| for j = 0 and
Aj = |0x〉B〈µj | otherwise. Since
∑
j A
†
jAj ≤ 1, there ex-
ists a filter with the following property. It takes any state
ρ acting on HB as an input, and it accepts with proba-
bility p =
∑
j Tr(A
†
jAjρ) while it rejects with probability
1 − p. Whenever it accepts, it returns the output state∑
j AjρA
†
j/p acting on KB. This filter is related to the
POVM {F0, F1, F2} by
Fk =
∑
j
A†j |kz〉B〈kz |Aj (1)
for k = 0, 1, which is easily confirmed. This rela-
tion implies that we can implement the measurement
{F0, F1, F2} by applying the filter and conducting Z-basis
measurement on the output state when it accepts (if it
rejects, we assume that the outcome is “2”).
With the above decomposition of Bob’s measurement,
we can prove the unconditional security by a method sim-
ilar to the cases of qubit-based B92 protocols [7, 8]. We
introduce a protocol based on entanglement distillation
[12], which is later shown to be equivalent to the real
protocol. In the new protocol, (1) Alice prepares state
(|0z〉A|α〉+|1z〉A|−α〉)/
√
2 on KA⊗HA. We assume that
Alice produces 2N copies of this state. (2) Eve receives
2N pulses (corresponding to H⊗2NA ) from Alice, and pre-
pares a state on H⊗2NB , which may be entangled to Eve’s
system. (3) After Bob has received 2N pulses (corre-
sponding to H⊗2NB ), Alice and Bob randomly permutate
the order of 2N pairs of systems by public discussion. (4)
For the first N pairs (check pairs), Alice measures each
qubit (KA) on Z basis, and Bob performs the POVM
{F0, F1, F2} on each pulse (HB). They disclose all the
results, and learn the number nerr of error events where
the combination of Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes are (0, 1)
or (1, 0). (5) For the other N pairs (data pairs), Bob
applies the above filter to each pulse, and discloses each
result (accept or reject). Let nfil be the number of events
where the filter has accepted. (6) Alice and Bob now have
nfil pairs of qubits (KA⊗KB), from which they try to ex-
tract a number of pairs in the maximally entangled state
(|0z〉A|0z〉B + |1z〉A|1z〉B)/
√
2. To do so, they estimate
the number nbit of pairs with a bit error (represented by
the subspace spanned by {|0z〉A|1z〉B, |1z〉A|0z〉B}) and
the number nph of pairs with a phase error (the sub-
space spanned by {|0x〉A|1x〉B , |1x〉A|0x〉B}), from the
knowledge of nfil and nerr. If neither number of errors
is too high, they run an entanglement distillation proto-
col (EDP) and then measure on Z basis to determine the
3final key. As in the proof of BB84 [4], if the estimation
of the upper bounds for nbit and nph is correct except
for a probability that becomes exponentially small as N
increases, this protocol is essentially secure.
According to the argument by Shor and Preskill [4],
if we choose an appropriate EDP scheme, Alice and Bob
can conduct Z-basis measurement on the nfil pairs imme-
diately after step (5) and decide the final key by a pub-
lic discussion without compromising the security. Then,
Eq. (1) shows that Bob’s measurement on each data qubit
is also the POVM {F0, F1, F2}. Alice’s measurement can
be further brought forward to the end of step (1), then
this step is equivalent to just preparing state |α〉 or |−α〉
randomly. The new protocol is thus equivalent to the
prepare-measure protocol implemented as in Fig. 1(b).
The remaining task for the security proof is to estab-
lish an exponentially good way of estimating nbit and
nph. Since nerr and nbit are the results of the same mea-
surement applied to the (randomly assigned) check pairs
and to the data pairs, we can apply a classical probability
estimate to see that |nbit − nerr| ≤ Nǫ holds except for
a small probability which is asymptotically smaller than
∼ exp(−Nǫ2). The estimation of nph can be done by
considering what could have happened if Alice and Bob
measured their nfil pairs of data qubits in X basis and
determined nph by discussion, just after the step (5). In
this scenario, they obtain three numbers (nfil, nph, nerr).
The following argument shows that some combinations
of (nfil, nph, nerr) are exponentially rare for any attack
by Eve, and hence gives an (exponentially reliable) up-
per bound n¯ph(nfil, nerr) for nph as a function of the other
two.
We can regard nph as the number of events
where a measurement on KA ⊗ HB produced the
outcome corresponding to the element of a POVM
Mph ≡
∑
j P (|0x〉A) ⊗ A†j |1x〉B〈1x|Aj + P (|1x〉A) ⊗
A†j |0x〉B〈0x|Aj = s2βP (|1x〉A|0x〉B) + c2βP (|0x〉A|1x〉B) +
P (|1x〉A) ⊗ 1ex. Similarly, nfil corresponds to Mfil ≡
1A ⊗
∑
j A
†
jAj = 1A ⊗ (c2βP (|1x〉B) + s2βP (|0x〉B) +
1ex). From these forms, we notice that nph and
nfil are also obtained by the projection measurement
{P00, P11, P10, P01, P (|0x〉A)⊗1ex, P (|1x〉A)⊗1ex}, where
Pij ≡ P (|ix〉A|jx〉B), followed by a classical proce-
dure composed of Bernoulli trials. If we denote the
results of the N projection measurements as {n+(1 −
δ+), n+δ+, n−(1− δ−), n−δ−,m0,m1} in the same order,
these numbers should be related to nph and nfil as
|nph −m1 − n−[s2β(1− δ−) + c2βδ−]| ≤ Nǫ (2)
|nfil −m0 −m1 − c2β(n+δ+ + n−δ−)
−s2β[(n+(1− δ+) + n−(1− δ−)]| ≤ Nǫ (3)
with probability at least 1 − exp(2Nǫ2). Since the
marginal state ρA on KA cannot be altered by Eve, the
X-basis measurement on KA is another Bernoulli trial.
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FIG. 2: Key gain G is positive in the region between the
two solid curves. (a) |α|2 = 0.5, η = 0.01, (b) |α|2 = 10−3,
η = 0.01.
Since ρA = c
2
αP (|0x〉A) + s2αP (|1x〉A), we have
|m1 + n+δ+ + n−(1 − δ−)− s2αN | ≤ Nǫ.
For the check pairs, nerr corresponds to Merr ≡
P (|0z〉A) ⊗ F1 + P (|1z〉A) ⊗ F0 = (1/2)[P (|Γ11〉) +
P (|Γ01〉) + 1A ⊗ 1ex], where we have introduced a ba-
sis {|Γij〉}i,j=0,1 of KA ⊗ KB by |Γij〉 ≡ cβ |ix〉A|jx〉B −
(−1)jsβ |(1− i)x〉A|(1− j)x〉B. It implies that nerr could
also be obtained by the global projection measurement
{Q00, Q11, Q10, Q01,1A⊗1ex}, where Qij ≡ P (|Γij〉), fol-
lowed by Bernoulli trials. If we write the results of N
projection measurements as {n′+(1 − δ′+), n′+δ′+, n′−(1 −
δ′−), n
′
−δ
′
−,m}, we obtain
|nerr − (n′+δ′+ + n′−δ′− +m)/2| ≤ Nǫ.
If we compare the projection measurements on the
data pairs and the check pairs, we further notice that
n+ and n
′
+ are the results of an identical measure-
ment, namely, projection onto the space H+ spanned
by {|0x〉A|0x〉B , |1x〉A|1x〉B}. We can thus apply the
classical probability estimate. δ+ and δ
′
+ comes from
projection to nonorthogonal states. For such a case,
it was shown [7] that combination (δ+, δ
′
+) is exponen-
tially rare unless there exists a state ρ on H+ satisfying
Tr[ρP (|1x〉A|1x〉B)] = δ+ and Tr[ρP (|Γ11〉)] = δ′+. Using
these arguments, we obtain
|n± − n′±| ≤ Nǫ,
δ′± ≥ c2βδ± + s2β(1− δ±)− 2cβsβ
√
δ±(1 − δ±)− ǫ′.
We are interested in the secret key gain in the limit
N → ∞. Setting ǫ and ǫ′ to be zero, we obtain
2nerr ≥ nfil − 2cβsβ [n+
√
δ+(1− δ+) + n−
√
δ−(1− δ−)].
Then we can eliminate n± and δ± to be left with two free
parameters m0 and m1. From this point, in general, we
may have to numerically minimize nerr over the two pa-
rameters. It turned out that in most of interesting cases
m0 = m1 = 0 gives the minimum. Once we obtain the
minimum of nerr as a function of (nph, nfil), we can deter-
mine n¯ph(nfil, nerr). The length of the final key is given
4[4, 6] by nkey(nfil, nerr) = nfil[1−h(nerr/nfil)−h(n¯ph/nfil)]
when this value is nonnegative and 2n¯ph ≤ nfil.
Figure 2 shows the parameter region (nfil, nerr) where
the key gain G ≡ nkey/N is positive, for a few choices of
α and β =
√
ηα. When Alice chooses |α|2 = 0.5, the tol-
erable error rate nerr/nfil is less than 1%. For a smaller
amplitude |α|2 = 0.001, the tolerable rate increases to
∼ 7%. Choosing a smaller value for |α|2 than this ex-
ample does not improve the tolerable rate significantly.
For either case in Fig. 2, taking a smaller value of η gives
little change in the shape of region, except for the normal-
ization factor in the abscissa nfil0 ≡ N(1 − e4η|α|2)/2 ∼
2η|α|2N . This allows us to choose a fixed |α|2 in the limit
of η → 0 as long as nerr/nfil is fixed, leading to the key
gain G proportional to η.
In Fig. 2(b), we notice that the region extends far into
the area with high nerr/nfil and nfil, but ordinary sources
of errors never achieve this region. For example, Errors
in phase [∆φ in Fig. 1(b)] result in curve B. Errors by
spurious countings [device P in Fig. 1(b)], which is mod-
eled as nfil = Nλ + (1 − λ)nfil0 and nerr = Nλ/2, follow
curve A.
In order to achieve a high key gain, we can optimize
over |α|2 for a given model of errors. Here we assume
that all errors are spurious countings (curve A), and take
λ = γ+1−exp{−|α|2η[4ζ/(1−2ζ)]}. The first term is the
contribution independent of |α|2, such as the dark count-
ing rate of the detector. The rest represents “misalign-
ment errors”, which are caused by a stray light propor-
tional to the strength of LO. A mode mismatch between
Alice’s and Bob’s LO is an example of this type of errors.
We chose the parameter ζ such that nerr/nfil → ζ for
η → 0 when γ = 0. Assuming this model, we optimized
G over |α|2, which is shown in Fig. 3. For γ = ζ = 0
[curve (a)], the key gain decreases as G ∼ O(η), which
should be compared to the O(η2) decrease in the case
[5] where a coherent-state source is simply substituted
for a single-photon source in BB84 [curve (d)]. When η
is small, the optimal choice is |α|2 ∼ 0.23, which gives
nfil/N ∼ 0.91(η/2). The raw key is shorten by factor
∼ 0.69, leading to G ∼ 0.29(η/2). This value is smaller
than the ideal BB84 G = η/2 [curve (c)] by a constant
factor. If we include a small alignment error (ζ = 3%),
the key rate drops by a constant factor but the O(η)
dependence remains [curve (b)]. This tendency contin-
ues up to ζ ∼ 7.6%, at which the key gain is zero for
any value of |α|2. Finally, if we include a contribution
of dark counting γ, each curve drops to zero when the
overall counting rate is comparable to γ.
In summary, we have shown that by encoding on the
phase of a weak coherent pulse relative to a strong ref-
erence pulse, we can achieve a key rate of O(η) with
unconditional security, which is an advantage over the
coherent-state BB84. There are several proposals [13]
to improve the performance of the coherent-state BB84,
and their unconditional security is an interesting prob-
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FIG. 3: Key gain G versus transmission η. (a) ζ = γ = 0.
(b) ζ = 3%, γ = 0. (c) BB84 with an ideal single-photon
source for no errors. (d) BB84 with a coherent-state source
for no errors. (a’)–(d’): The same except for inclusion of dark
counting rate γ = 10−4.
lem. The security of the original B92, which uses only
one LO, is also interesting since the relation between the
amplitude of the reference pulse and the security will
show up more tightly.
The author thanks N. Imoto, H.-K. Lo, D. Mayers,
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